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THE FIGURE IN THE LANDSCAPE: A





A central question that underlies many analyses of corporate governance is
whether the law and legal institutions have a constituent role in shaping gov-
ernance practices, or whether the law, as well as governance practices, are best
viewed as the inevitable results of market forces, centered upon capital mar-
kets.  A separate, but related question is the degree to which mechanisms of
governance—such as shareholder voting, take-over bids, independent directors,
mandatory disclosure, and shareholder litigation—can function adequately as
substitutes for one another.  The perspective I offer on these questions is based
on a comparison between the United States and the United Kingdom, which
are sufficiently similar in relevant respects that their divergences are illumi-
nating.
The Law Commissions of England and Scotland recently released a Consul-
tation Paper surveying U.K. law on directors’ duties with a particular focus on
Part X of the Companies Act 1985, which addresses specific types of self-
dealing by directors.1  Reading the Consultation Paper is an instructive experi-
ence for one familiar with corporate law in the United States because it con-
founds conventional wisdom about the degree of similarity between corporate
law in the two countries.  The descriptive as well as the evaluative portions of
the Paper suggest that underlying principles diverge more between the United
States and the United Kingdom than often is assumed.  In particular, each
country’s body of law reflects different assumptions about the appropriate role
of specific institutions in shaping the conduct of corporate directors and man-
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1. THE LAW COMMISSION & THE SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, COMPANY DIRECTORS:
REGULATING CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS AND FORMULATING A STATEMENT OF DUTIES: A JOINT
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agers.
The degree of some of the substantive contrasts is striking.  For example,
the U.K. statute criminalizes particular transactions that, in the United States,
would be well within the discretion of financially disinterested directors.  As
legislation, moreover, Part X of the Companies Act 1985 has a style and feel
that is distinctly different from counterpart provisions in U.S. corporation stat-
utes.  Finally, the Consultation Paper illustrates the difficulty of rethinking set-
tled doctrines and statutory structures within the law, so pervasive and inescap-
able is the force of underlying assumptions.  Even analyses grounded in
economics may reflect starting assumptions drawn not from economic princi-
ples of general applicability, but from a specific legal context.
In this article, I focus on the subject of Part X—transactions involving self-
interested directors—drawing contrasts with corporate law in the United
States.  I focus primarily on public companies and on the law of Delaware, the
leading situs of incorporation in the United States for public companies.2  I ex-
amine several types of conflict scenarios: self-dealing between the corporation
itself and the director; indemnification; directors’ pursuit of business opportuni-
ties related to the corporation; and defenses to hostile take-over bids.
The legal treatment of self-interested transactions diverges more between
the United States and the United Kingdom than one might predict, given com-
mon starting points.  The United States and the United Kingdom share a legal
heritage encompassing the common law and principles of equity.  Corporation
statutes in both countries do not supplant these principles.3  In both countries,
corporation law is grounded in a necessary formalism that treats the corpora-
tion itself as a distinct legal entity that may incur obligations and possess rights
separate from its owners.  Likewise, although directors owe duties to the corpo-
ration itself, corporate law accords primacy to shareholders’ interests.
In both countries, moreover, much business financing and investment is in-
termediated by capital markets, in contrast with financial systems predomi-
nantly organized around relatively activist financial institutions that themselves
make and hold loans to business borrowers, and buy and hold equity invest-
ments in businesses.4  Against a backdrop of such similarity, differences in cor-
porate law are especially significant when they affect the resolution of ques-
tions raised by common recurrences, such as transactions in which directors
have a conflict of interest.  The degree of divergence between U.S. and U.K.
corporate law suggests that there is a much looser connection between the
structure and operation of capital markets and the particular doctrines in un-
                                                          
2. According to the most recent study, the degree of divergence among corporation statutes is
not large.  See William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715 (1998).
3. See L.C.B. Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69 HARV.
L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1956).
4. See RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL., CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AROUND THE WORLD 5 (NBER
Working Paper 6625, June 1998).  See generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS:
THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
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derlying corporate law than is often assumed.5
Three types of divergence between U.S. and U.K. corporate law are par-
ticularly noticeable.  First, the rules applicable to shareholder voting, as well as
the function served by it, are different.  In the United States, mandatory statu-
tory rules have the effect of requiring that a substantial number of shareholders
be given the opportunity to vote at periodic intervals on the initial election and
subsequent reelection of directors.6  Corporate law in the United Kingdom, in
contrast, relegates these matters to provisions in the corporation’s articles, but
by statute in the United Kingdom, shareholder approval by vote is requisite to
validate a range of transactions in which directors have conflicts.7  Current U.K.
corporate law is thus mandatory in contexts when U.S. corporate law is not,
while U.K. law permits articles of the corporation to structure the most basic
architecture for the relationship between shareholders and directors.  These
contrasts make relevant the contrasting demographics of shareholding in each
country as well as contrasts in the composition of boards of directors.
Second, in the United States, statutes and cases invest in disinterested direc-
tors a considerable measure of discretion to assess the merits of conflict trans-
actions and to determine in good faith whether and on what terms to bind the
corporation to any such transaction.  The role ascribed to the disinterested di-
rector unifies what are often treated as distinct doctrines, involving self-dealing
transactions, corporate opportunities, and defenses to hostile take-over bids.
The significance that U.S. law ascribes to the disinterested director’s role
makes it important to define its boundaries and to evaluate its credibility as an
institution for discretionary decisionmaking internal to the corporation.  An in-
evitable question is whether or under what circumstances disinterested direc-
tors are appropriately accountable to the interests of the corporation’s share-
holders.  In contrast, the disinterested director, as distinct from the self-
interested director, does not figure in the picture of current U.K. law surveyed
in the Consultation Paper, nor is the disinterested director cast as a favored
player in the reforms discussed by the Commissions.8  U.K. law allocates
authority to make discretionary decisions about questions implicated by direc-
tors’ conflicts elsewhere—within the corporation to shareholders, and to deci-
sionmakers external to the corporation itself.
Third, the United States and the United Kingdom diverge in the style and
structure of corporate legislation and in the assumptions reflected in legislation
regarding the likelihood of litigation.  As noted above, U.K. corporate law
permits a corporation’s articles to prescribe rules on matters that, in the United
States, are addressed in mandatory fashion in corporation statutes.  It would
nonetheless be a mistake to think that, on balance, U.K. corporate law is more
                                                          
5. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, International Corporate Differences: Markets or Law?, 9 J. APP.
CORP. FIN. 23 (1997) (characterizing law as an output of the drive toward economic efficiency).
6. See Companies (Tables A-F) Regulations 1985, S1 1985/805 (“Table A”) regs. 40 & 73
[hereinafter 1985 Regulations].
7. See, e.g.,  Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6, §§ 315, 322.
8. See CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 1, ¶¶ 4.197-.199.
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permissive or “contractualist,” because such a characterization ignores the con-
tent and flavor of Part X of the Companies Act 1985.9  Much that Part X pro-
hibits for U.K. corporations, or that it deals with in nonprohibitory but very de-
tailed provisions, is in U.S. statutes swept within broad grants of discretion to
directors.  Accompanying the discretion is a likelihood of litigation challenging
transactions that appear to be problematic.  In the United Kingdom, by con-
trast, litigation appears to be more a fortuitous occurrence than one that is pre-
dictable.
Specifics aside for a moment, consider as a starting point a visual metaphor
that illustrates the most striking disparity.  Imagine a painting with a scenic
background dominated in its foreground by a portrait of an individual person.
Like the portrait, the independent director—strengths, weaknesses, constraints,
and credibility—dominates the U.S. landscape, figuring prominently in statutes,
cases, and academic commentary.  The same landscape with the portrait re-
moved is, in contrast, the image of corporate law in the United Kingdom that
emerges from the Consultation Paper.
II
CORPORATE DEMOGRAPHICS
Directors do not act in isolation; as the Consultation Paper observes, they
are “mutually interdependent” with shareholders, who “rely on directors to
manage the enterprise competently, without taking personal benefits, loyally
and on the basis that so far as practicable shareholders are kept in the picture
about any matter which is relevant to them.”10  Directors, in turn, rely on
shareholders “to maintain their investment in the company and exercise their
powers in respect of decision-making reserved to them in a favorable man-
ner.”11  Corporate law does not, of course, treat directors’ reliance identically
with that of shareholders.  The legally enforceable duties of directors underpin
shareholders’ reliance, while directors’ reliance is grounded in optimistic, but
unenforceable expectations of shareholder support.
The extent to which share-ownership is widely dispersed or concentrated, as
well as its composition as between individuals and institutions, defines much of
                                                          
9. This contrast calls into question the accuracy of the claim that in responding to a corporate
governance crisis, while U.S. lawmakers might “pass a new law or regulation,” the U.K. response
would be “a blue-ribbon committee that recommends changes in current practice,” typically mild
changes in light of the nature of the committee process.  Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail
Brittania?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2023
(1994).  As the Law Commissions explain, Part X reflects the legislative response of successive Parlia-
ments to scandals and other perceived instances of slippage in corporate governance practices.  See
CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1.9-.10.  In general, though, extra-governmental responses to
perceived problems appear to play a distinctive and significant role in the reform of corporate govern-
ance in the United Kingdom.  See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, The Hampel Committee Report: A Transat-
lantic Critique, 19 COMPANY LAW. 110, 112 (1998) (“[T]o see British business leaders pursuing these
objectives voluntarily—or at least to be moving in the right direction—is impressive and seems almost
Victorian in its uprightness.”).
10. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 1, ¶ 2.12.
11. Id.
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the texture of the interdependence between directors and shareholders.  Direc-
tors are more likely to be responsive to the expectations of large shareholders
and large consolidated groups of shareholders than to the expectations—
however determined or expressed—of a diffused and widely dispersed group.
To begin with, large holders are better able to formulate and state expectations.
Though in both the United States and the United Kingdom much business
financing and investment are intermediated by capital markets, patterns of
share-ownership differ in the two countries.  Institutions in the United King-
dom currently hold about sixty percent of shares in listed U.K. companies; in-
dividuals hold half of the remainder, while non-U.K. institutions hold the other
half.12  Fund managers, appointed by trustees of U.K. pension schemes, likely
have the power to sell over two-thirds of all listed U.K. equities.13  In the
United States, direct individual ownership of shares is much higher than in the
United Kingdom.  However, as of 1997, institutional ownership accounted for
47.7% of outstanding equities, representing a dramatic increase from the 7.2%
of equities held by institutions in 1950.14  Patterns vary among markets and in-
dustry cohorts.  For example, individual investors are the dominant trading
force in some market sectors, such as technology stocks.15  That individuals
dominate trading activity does not necessarily mean that they dominate owner-
ship, however.  It is also helpful to distinguish among types of individual hold-
ers.  In the NASDAQ market, which includes many technology-based compa-
nies, institutions own about half the outstanding holdings based on market
value, directors of listed companies own about a quarter, and other
“individuals” own the remaining quarter.16
An additional point of contrast is the degree to which institutional holdings
are concentrated.  Institutional ownership is generally believed to be much
more concentrated in the United Kingdom; the twenty-five largest institutions
reportedly own an absolute majority of stock in many companies.17  United
Kingdom institutions have long been able to communicate and coordinate in
ways facilitated by geographical concentration in the United Kingdom but in-
hibited by geographical dispersion and regulatory barriers in the United
                                                          
12. See COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, FINAL REPORT ¶ 5.1 (1998) (Sir Ronald
Hampel, chair) [hereinafter HAMPEL REPORT].
13. See GEOF P. STAPLEDON, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
48-49 (1996).
14. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 1997 FACT BOOK 61-62 (1998).  But from 1992-95, the
number of individual shareholders holding stock directly declined from 29.2 million to 27.4 million, a
decline offset by the 3.3 million increase in the number of shareholders holding stock directly or
through an equity mutual fund.  See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, SHAREOWNERSHIP 1998, 10
(1998).
15. Greg Ip, Individuals’ Role in Stock Market Grows as the Influence of Institutions Declines,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1998, at C1.
16. See NASDAQ STOCK MARKET, 1996 FACT BOOK & COMPANY DIRECTORY 29 (1996).  The
NASDAQ market attracts 85% of initial public offerings in the United States.  See id. at 1.  In dollar
volume of trading, it is the second largest equity market in the United States.  NASDAQ’s dollar vol-
ume in 1995 trading was $2,398,214 million compared with $3,082,916 million on the New York Stock
Exchange.  See id. at 8.
17. See Black & Coffee, supra note 9, at 2002.
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States.18  Some regulatory barriers in the United States have weakened, but in-
stitutions remain more diffused as owners than are institutional holders in the
United Kingdom.  Only relatively recently have U.S. institutions coalesced and
intervened to compel changes in management.19
Patterns in board composition have long diverged between public compa-
nies in the United States and those in the United Kingdom as well, although the
degree of divergence is narrowing. Boards in the United Kingdom have histori-
cally included fewer members who were not also officers of the corporation.
The Hampel Committee reported in 1998 that, in large companies, boards often
have “roughly equal numbers” of executive and non-executive directors, while
small listed companies “tend to have a majority of executive directors.”20  In the
United States, by contrast, “outside” (non-executive) directors predominate on
the boards of public companies.  In a 1998 study, the average board had two
“inside” (executive) directors and nine outside directors.21  Moreover, the prac-
tices of using an audit committee22 and a compensation committee23 comprised
of outside directors are well-established norms for U.S. public companies.
These developments in the United States make it unsurprising that
“management” might not always be viewed as a unitary force and that, as more
fully explored below, corporate law might differentiate functions between a
corporation’s outside directors and its operational managers.  To be sure, being
an “outside” director is not synonymous with “disinterested” as to a particular
decision.  On many of the points addressed in the Consultation Paper, U.S.
corporate law invests decisionmaking discretion in disinterested directors who
are often, but not always, “outside” directors.
III
CORPORATE LAW AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The scope of the Consultation Paper does not encompass all aspects of cor-
porate law that are generally relevant to the relationships between directors
and shareholders.  Nonetheless, corporate law does not address directors’ con-
flict transactions in isolation.  Therefore, contrasts between corporate law in
                                                          
18. See id.
19. See BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND OPERATION 617-39
(1997).  It is important not to overstate the significance of regulatory barriers to divergent governance
structures.  For example, although regulation did not constrain the governance role of U.K. banks as it
did U.S. banks, corporate governance in the United Kingdom is not dominated by banks as it is in
Germany.  See Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corpo-
rate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021, 2028 (1993).
20. HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 12, ¶ 3.14.
21. See KORN/FERRY INT’L, 25TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS SURVEY 14 (1998).
22. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.05 cmt. a (1994) (noting that the New York Stock Exchange requires listed
companies to establish and maintain an audit committee comprised of directors who are independent
of management and free of any relationship that would interfere with the exercise of independent
judgment).
23. See id. § 3A.05 cmt. a (reporting the widespread practice in public companies of employing a
compensation committee comprised entirely of outside directors).
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the United States and the United Kingdom, albeit on points not addressed in
the Consultation Paper, are relevant.
In two basic respects, corporate law in the United States mandatorily pre-
scribes answers to questions left in the United Kingdom to resolution in the
company’s articles.  First, U.S. corporation statutes specify a mandatory mini-
mum of shares—at least a third—that must be present in person or by proxy at
the corporation’s annual meeting to constitute a valid quorum.24  In a corpora-
tion with widely dispersed shareholding, the mandatory minimum quorum typi-
cally necessitates the solicitation of proxies by the corporation’s incumbent di-
rectors.  It is thus not feasible for incumbent directors to rely on a combination
of shareholder inertia and a low quorum set in the company’s articles to assure
their reelection.  The U.K. statute does not prescribe any minimum quorum,
and it is U.K. practice to specify a very small quorum in the articles.25  The
Hampel Committee reports that fewer than forty percent of shares were voted
in the last five years.26
Second, U.S. corporation statutes specify a maximum term—most typically
three years—for which a director may be elected.27  The U.K. statute does not
impose a cap on directors’ terms, although Section 319 of the Companies Act
1985 requires shareholder approval for directors’ employment contracts that
exceed five years in duration.28  The Hampel Committee reports and endorses
institutional investors’ expectations that directors submit to reelection at
“regular intervals of no more than three years,” recommending as well that
biographical information be provided to enable shareholders to make informed
decisions.29  In contrast, in the United States, the federal regulation of proxy
solicitations incident to annual meetings has long mandated the provision of
such information.30  Indeed, securities regulation in the United States attempts
to assure that beneficial holders of shares receive proxy material rather than
                                                          
24. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (1998) (noting that in no event shall a quorum consist of
fewer than one-third of shares entitled to vote); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.27(a) (articles may re-
quire a quorum greater than a simple majority of votes entitled to be cast).
25. See PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 584 (6th ed. 1997).
The default set in Table A, applicable unless the company’s articles prescribe otherwise, is a two-
member quorum.  See 1985 Regulations, supra note 6, Table A, reg. 40.
26. See Hampel Report, supra note 12, ¶ 5.7.  As of the early 1990s, usually fewer than 15% of
shares were voted at annual meetings.  See JONATHAN CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY 295
(1994).  This data likely reflects the lack of any mandatory requirement that U.K. institutions vote
shares that they hold as fiduciaries for others, comparable to the expectation that U.S. pension fund
managers exercise their proxy-voting power.  See Barnard, supra note 9, at 115.
27. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1998); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.06 (staggered-
term statutes).
28. This limit, by definition, applies only to directors who also have an employment relationship
with the corporation.
29. HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 12, ¶ 3.21.  The default set in Table A is that one-third of the
corporation’s directors should retire and stand for reelection annually.  See 1985 Regulations, supra
note 6, Table A, reg. 73.  The Hampel Committee’s recommendation suggests either that some com-
panies with Table A articles do not comply with them, or that some articles do not adopt the Table A
default.
30. See Proxy Rule 14a-3 & Schedule 14A, item 7.
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leaving voting decisions to registered or nominee holders alone.31
In these basic respects, corporate law speaking in a mandatory voice plays a
larger role in structuring relationships between shareholders and directors in
the United States than in the United Kingdom.  United States law, as we shall
shortly see, vests in disinterested directors the capacity to exercise discretion on
questions that U.K. law reserves to shareholders.  The mandatory rules just
surveyed, though, undergird the directors’ position with an assured frequency
of occasions at which a relatively large proportion of shareholders affirmatively
vote to continue the director’s service.32  This assurance may appear less impor-
tant if the number of holders of shares is smaller, or if relatively large holdings
are common and are not generally used toward ends that disadvantage smaller
holders.
IV
STATUTORY TREATMENT OF DISINTERESTED DIRECTORS
As in the United Kingdom, the operative content of corporate law in the
United States is a combination of legislation and cases.  State corporation stat-
utes vary in the extent to which they attempt to codify directors’ duties.  In
Delaware, case law plays a large role in defining the limits imposed on direc-
tors’ fiduciary position in the exercise of powers they hold by virtue of their po-
sition.  The Model Business Corporation Act, in contrast, codifies directors’ du-
ties; however, its appearance of certainty is belied by the open texture of its
language, which includes terms like “good faith,” “reasonably,” and “under
similar circumstances.”33
For our immediate purposes, these differences matter less than the fact that
corporation statutes in the United States specify the types of decisions that may
be made by disinterested directors.  In particular, statutes define a decision-
making role for disinterested directors with regard to self-dealing transactions
                                                          
31. See IV LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 1943 (3d ed. 1989).  In con-
trast, the Hampel Committee characterizes nominee holding as a circumstance that “deprives the in-
vestors concerned of the right to vote and receive company information unless some special arrange-
ment is made.”  HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 12, ¶ 5.25.  Many custodians that use nominee holders
“seek to pass company information to investors for reasons of good service and good practice, and will
actively arrange for investors’ views to be reflected in a proxy vote.”  RICHARD SMERDON, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 209 (1998).  Statutory reinforcement for these
practices is under consideration by government departments.
32. At initial glance, shareholders in U.K. companies are assured the right to remove directors
without cause by Companies Act 1985, § 303, whereas in a Delaware corporation in which the board is
classified into staggered terms, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1998), directors may be removed
only for cause unless the certificate of incorporation affirmatively provides otherwise, see id. §
141(k)(1).  This difference is less than immediately meets the eye, for in Bushell v. Faith, 1 App. Cas.
1099 (1970), the House of Lords upheld a “golden share” issued to a director that assured him of the
power to outvote other shareholders when his removal was at issue.  The listing requirements for a
listing on the U.K. stock exchange disallow an arrangement comparable to that in Bushell v. Faith.  See
Gerard McCormack, Institutional Shareholders and the Promotion of Good Corporate Governance, in
THE REALM OF  COMPANY LAW: A COLLECTION OF PAPERS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR LEONARD
SEALY 131, 141 (Barry A.K. Rider ed., 1998).
33. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30.
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and indemnification.
A.  Self-dealing Transactions
Statutory treatments of self-dealing are not identical among jurisdictions,
but the Delaware provision is illustrative.34  Section 144 of the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law applies to a contract or transaction between a corpora-
tion and one or more of its directors or officers, as well as to a contract or
transaction between a corporation and another organization in which one or
more directors or officers of the corporation are also directors or officers of the
organization or have a financial interest in the transaction.  Section 144 pro-
vides that such a contract or transaction shall not be void or voidable as a con-
sequence of the director’s or officer’s interest, or due to his presence or partici-
pation in a meeting of the board or a committee at which the contract or
transaction is authorized, if any of three conditions is satisfied:
(1)  The material facts as to the director’s or officer’s relationship or interest and as to
the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the board of directors or the
committee, and the board or committee in good faith authorizes the contract or tran s-
action by the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors, even
though the disinterested directors be less than a quorum; or
(2)  The material facts as to the director’s or officer’s relationship or interest and as to
the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the shareholders entitled to
vote thereon, and the contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by
vote of the shareholders; or
(3)  The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is
authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the share-
holders.
 35
Section 144 and its counterparts in other states are often characterized as
“safe harbor” provisions because they shelter the transaction from jeopardy.36
Safe harbor provisions differ from the content of Part X in style and structure
as well as operative content: They are drawn broadly and encompass situations
dealt with individually in separate sections in Part X.  Safe harbor provisions
succinctly delineate authority, as well as the circumstances that legitimate its
exercise by a particular decisionmaker.37
                                                          
34. One point of difference is simply the level of detail specified by the statute itself.  The Dela-
ware provision is much shorter and stated in more general terms than its counterpart in the Model
Business Corporation Act.  Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1998) with MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT §§ 8.60-.63.
35. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1)-(3) (1998).
36. As the third option in the tripartite Delaware statute contemplates litigation in which a court
evaluates the merits of the transaction, it affords a less snug harbor than the other two options.
37. One evident difference among statutes is the extent to which the statute appears to foreclose
the possibility of any judicial scrutiny.  The Delaware statute requires that approval by disinterested
directors be “in good faith,” and Delaware cases articulating the elements of the business judgment
rule require that directors act with due care in an informed manner.  See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984).  The counterpart safe harbor provision in the Model Business Corporation Act,
section 8.62, does not itself require that disinterested directors act in good faith and with due care.
Commentary to a prior section, section 8.61(b), states that the board’s action in this context must com-
ply with the general standards stated in section 8.30(a) for all directors’ actions, which require that di-
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Moreover, Section 330 in Part X categorically prohibits loans and guaran-
tees on behalf of directors and persons connected to them—transactions that
would be within the scope of Delaware’s safe harbor provision.  As it happens,
the preceding section in the Delaware statute, section 143, specifically author-
izes a corporation to lend money to, or guarantee obligations incurred by, any
employee or officer, including one who is also a director, whenever “in the
judgment of the directors” such transaction “may reasonably be expected to
benefit the corporation.”38  In this connection, it is striking that the chapter of
the Consultation Paper devoted to “economic considerations” observes that “it
is difficult to envisage circumstances where a loan from the company, as op-
posed to one from a third party, would be justified.39  The Delaware statute
leaves to the assessment of directors whether such circumstances are present
and assumes that creditors’ interests are sufficiently protected by the risk of li-
ability assumed by directors whose judgment does not meet the statutory stan-
dard or whose action otherwise constitutes a breach of their duties of care and
loyalty.
Unlike Part X, safe harbor provisions authorize a decisionmaking role for
disinterested directors, even when their number is insufficient to constitute a
quorum.  Safe harbor provisions also contemplate that a court may review the
substantive merits, or fairness, of the transaction.  In both respects, the statu-
tory provisions reflect prior evolution in cases from an initial position, held
through the last quarter of the nineteenth century, making any contract be-
tween a director and the corporation voidable at the corporation’s insistence.40
In his study of this evolution, Harold Marsh reports that “one searches in vain
in the decided cases for a reasoned defense of this change in legal philosophy”
to permit the transaction to be insulated from challenge by a majority of disin-
terested directors.41  Judicial review to ascertain the fairness of transactions, as
an alternative to approval by disinterested directors, appears to surface in the
cases by 1960.42  The status of shareholder ratification is less significant because
it is not needed if the court finds the transaction to be fair.43  In any event, un-
like sui juris beneficiaries of a trust negotiating with their trustee, shareholders
are limited to accepting or rejecting a transaction negotiated by the interested
                                                          
rectors act with care, in good faith, and in a manner reasonably believed to be in the corporation’s best
interests.  See also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 22, § 5.02 reporter’s note 13.
38. Id. § 143.  The wisdom of permitting such loans has been questioned.  See Jayne W. Barnard,
Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers: Every Business Now a Bank? , 1988 WIS. L.  REV. 237.  The
District of Columbia is, as of this date, the sole remaining U.S. jurisdiction categorically to prohibit
loans to directors.  See D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-304(6) (1997-98) (corporation lacks the power to make a
loan to its own director).
39. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 1, ¶ 3.55.
40. See Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?  Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22
BUS. LAW. 35, 36 (1966).
41. Id. at 40.
42. See id. at 43-44.
43. It is telling that under current Delaware law, the legal consequences of attempted shareholder
ratification are not clear.  See Mary A. Jacobson, Note, Interested Director Transactions and the
(Equivocal) Effects of Shareholder Ratification, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981 (1996).
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directors, who had no disinterested representative at the bargaining table and
were not present at the table themselves.44  Of course, the knowledge that
shareholders must approve a transaction may shape the evolution of the trans-
action, especially when the shareholders are believed to be astute and vigilant.
But in most instances, shareholders will not participate directly either in struc-
turing the transaction or in making the nuanced assessment of tradeoffs that is
integral to any bargaining process.  In short, courts in the United States may
have acquiesced in the determinations of disinterested directors because such
directors are, at least in theory, capable of representing the shareholders’ inter-
ests in shaping the terms of the transaction.  And courts may have believed that
substantive judicial review is more likely to detect problematic transactions
than is submission to shareholders.
Delaware cases have evolved a set of distinctions that define thresholds for
substantive judicial review.  Whether the court will review the merits of the di-
rectors’ decision depends on whether the transaction involves simply a director
or, additionally, a shareholder with voting control over the corporation.  Under
a safe harbor provision, in a transaction involving a director or officer, a ma-
jority of disinterested directors may bind the corporation to the transaction if
the interested director or officer discloses material facts and if the disinterested
directors act in good faith.  If these conditions are satisfied, Delaware cases
treat the disinterested directors’ decision as a business judgment, which means
that the court does not review the merits of the decision.45
An interested director has a duty to be candid, which requires disclosure of
“all material information relevant to corporate decisions from which they may
derive a personal benefit.”46  If a director does not disclose an interest to the
board, the corporation has a range of remedies available to it, including the as-
sertion of an ownership interest in property the director has acquired through
the transaction.47  If the director breaches the duty of candor, it is not likely to
be a defense for the director that he paid a price fair at the time of the transac-
tion for property acquired from the corporation because, in Delaware, the test
for fairness is “entire fairness,” which encompasses fair dealing as well as fair
price.48  If the director discloses an interest to the board, the focal points in liti-
gation will be whether the disclosure was sufficient to enable the disinterested
directors to assess the corporation’s interests,49 and whether the disinterested
directors acted in an informed manner and in good faith.50  Disinterested direc-
tors who are adequately informed and who approve a transaction in good faith
                                                          
44. See Marsh, supra note 40, at 49.
45. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987).
46. Mills Acq. Co. v. Macmillan Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989).
47. See State ex rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 391 P.2d 979 (Wash. 1964).
48. See id.
49. The classic illustration is Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica  Gas & Elec. Co., 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y.
1918).
50. For a recent illustration, see In re The Walt Disney Co., No. 15452, 1998 WL 731587 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 7, 1998).
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are protected from personal liability by the business judgment rule, which,
when applicable, forecloses substantive judicial review of the merits of the
transaction itself.
In contrast, if the contract or transaction involves a controlling share-
holder—who is likely to have representatives on the corporation’s board—the
court examines the substantive fairness of the transaction to the corporation
and its noncontrolling shareholders.  In Kahn v. Tremont Corp.,51 the Delaware
Supreme Court recently clarified the law on this point.  When directors evalu-
ate a transaction with a controlling shareholder, the reality is that the share-
holder “will continue to dominate the company regardless of the outcome of
the transaction.”52  As a result, “those who pass upon the propriety of the trans-
action might perceive that disapproval may result in retaliation by the control-
ling shareholder,” even when the directors who approve the transaction are
otherwise free of ties to the controlling shareholder. 53  Indeed, a “risk of re-
taliation” is present if the noncontrolling shareholders pass upon the transac-
tion, given the controlling shareholder’s power to elect directors with authority
to make determinations on matters like dividends.54
Statutory safe harbor provisions are different in scope and operation from
section 317 of the Companies Act 1985.  Section 317 requires directors to dis-
close to the board any interests they may have in present or proposed contracts
with the corporation.  A director who fails to comply with section 317 is subject
to a fine.  Section 317 does not vest discretion in the board’s disinterested direc-
tors to determine whether the contract is fair to the corporation.  It operates as
an adjunct to the general law, which determines when a self-dealing transaction
is voidable.55
Statutory safe harbor provisions also differ in operation from sections 320-
22 of the Companies Act 1985, which require shareholder approval in general
meetings before a director’s purchase from or sale to the corporation of sub-
stantial noncash assets.56  Absent prior approval, the transaction is voidable by
the corporation unless shareholders affirm it in general meeting, restitution is
no longer possible, or bona fide third-party rights would be adversely affected
by unwinding the transaction.  In any event, absent prior shareholder approval,
the director is liable to account to the corporation for profit realized and to
compensate it for loss.57
The mandatory shareholder approval requirements imposed by U.K. com-
pany law likely have varied consequences.  Consider first the possible impact
                                                          
51. 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502 (Del. Ch. 1990).
55. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 12, ¶ 4.78.
56. The treatment of such transactions in Table A is silent on whether shareholder approval is
requisite.  See Table A, supra note 6, reg. 85-86.  Given the statutory mandate imposed by sections
320-22, the contents of Table A appear to be lagging.
57. See Companies Act 1985, ch. 6, § 322(3).
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on self-dealing transactions, and second the possible impact upon, or relation-
ship to, the demographics of shareholding.  The requirement might result in
fewer self-dealing transactions, or in transactions whose proposed terms reflect
awareness that a shareholder vote will be necessary.  In considering these pos-
sibilities, the cost of obtaining shareholder approval is relevant.  If shareholding
in a corporation is widely dispersed, and if shareholder approval for the self-
dealing requires a separate communication to shareholders followed by a
meeting, the cost will be greater than in a corporation with less widely dis-
persed ownership.  Alternatively, this prospect might make it more attractive to
corporate directors to enlist large shareholders to reduce the cost of obtaining
consent to self-deal,58 or it might reduce the number of self-dealing transactions
if directors find the benefits of wider-cast shareholding outweigh the foregone
advantages of self-dealing.  A further possibility is that the incidence of self-
dealing and the degree of dispersion in shareholding might be unrelated, which
could be the case if the marginal costs of submission to shareholders are not so
great, or if directors are uninhibited in imposing such costs on companies.  This
possibility is supported by the belief that U.K. shareholders, institutional as
well as individual, tend toward unengagement.59  Finally, the prospect that a
self-dealing transaction would be assessed by a relatively small number of so-
phisticated investors may itself inhibit self-dealing or encourage moderation in
the transaction’s proponents.
The Consultation Paper expressly considers, and provisionally rejects, a
shift toward allocating discretion to disinterested directors to approve self-
dealing transactions.  Acknowledging that convenience and cost savings would
follow such a shift, the Consultation Paper relies on three objections: (1)
“Beneficial disclosure to shareholders” would be lost; (2) the concept of inde-
pendence would require definition; and (3) it would be difficult to assure “that
the independent directors had in fact decided the matter in an independent
way.”60
Resolving these issues in a satisfactory manner is crucial to the effectiveness
and credibility of a corporate governance system.  The response characteristic
of the United States may not be feasible in the United Kingdom.  The funda-
mental point is that corporation statutes do not operate in a legal or institu-
tional vacuum.  Mandatory disclosure requirements, imposed by federal securi-
ties regulation, supplement the operation of corporate law itself in the United
States.  A self-dealing transaction in a public company must be disclosed in the
corporation’s annual report in compliance with requirements imposed by the
                                                          
58. Professor Sealy noted that mandatory submission to shareholders would open the prospect
that “companies will shrink from the expense, and cultivate the institutional investors.”  L.S. SEALY,
COMPANY LAW AND COMMERCIAL REALITY 29 (1984).  An empirical test for Professor Sealy’s ar-
gument would examine shifts in shareholding patterns in the wake of Part X’s requirements.
59. See CHARKHAM, supra note 26, at 335 (“The reality is that many shareholders do not see their
interests, or those on whose behalf they hold shares, being best served by taking any interest in or
playing any part in corporate governance.”).  Relatively few U.K. shareholders vote, at all, and institu-
tional shareholders are subject to no legal mandate to vote.  See supra text accompanying note 26.
60. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 1, ¶¶ 4.197-.199.
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Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”).61  Although the annual re-
port in which the disclosure is made is not distributed to shareholders, who re-
ceive a shorter version, the report must be filed with the SEC and is a generally
accessible public document.  Indeed, the report is available without charge and
can be obtained very rapidly by all who search the SEC’s public database and
filing system, EDGAR.62  Disclosures of conflict-of-interest transactions are
trolled with keen interest by financial journalists, institutional investors, and
likely by entrepreneurial lawyers who represent shareholders in litigation.
Moreover, the threat of a shareholder lawsuit, brought derivatively on behalf of
the corporation, is a serious prospect in the United States in connection with
aggressively structured self-dealing transactions.  The occurrence of such suits
has produced a robust body of cases defining circumstances in which directors
are likely to have acted independently, as well as a demonstrable judicial ca-
pacity to examine the circumstances specific to a particular transaction.63
In short, in the United States, safe harbor provisions in corporation statutes
vest discretion in disinterested directors to commit the corporation to conflict
transactions.  Directors must exercise the discretion in good faith and an in-
formed manner to be insulated from personal liability.  Judicial review of the
substantive merits of self-dealing transactions is available.  Transactions with
controlling shareholders are subject to judicial review on their merits, as are di-
rectors’ self-dealing transactions in the absence of approval by disinterested di-
rectors or shareholders.  These doctrines create incentives to install credible in-
stitutions for decisionmaking at the board level by rewarding boards with
disinterested members through the insulation afforded by the business judg-
ment rule.  To the extent U.S. corporate law has enhanced the expectations ap-
plicable to directors by articulating specific functions that directors must fulfill,
the significance of the disinterested director’s role has been enhanced as well.
Moreover, as a consequence of the rich informational environment in the
United States,64  the occurrence of a self-dealing transaction of any significant
magnitude in a public corporation is readily ascertainable.  Shareholder litiga-
tion challenging the terms of such transactions and the circumstances under
which directors approve them occurs with some frequency.  In contrast with the
United Kingdom, different mechanisms of accountability are at work in the
United States.  In the stead of direct shareholder approval through a vote, as is
                                                          
61. See Regulation S-K, item 404, 17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (1999) (requiring disclosure of any transac-
tion involving an amount in excess of $60,000 in which a direct or indirect material interest is held by a
director, a nominee for election as director, a record or beneficial holder known to the company to
own more than five percent of any class of voting securities, or by any member of the immediate family
of such person).
62. EDGAR filings may be accessed through the SEC’s website: <http://www.sec.gov>.
63. For a discussion of recent cases illustrating such examination, see Grover C. Brown et al., Di-
rector and Advisor Disinterestedness and Independence under Delaware Law, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1157
(1998).
64. The breadth of directors’ duties of disclosure in the United States has been usefully contrasted
with the U.K. position in John Lowry, Ratifying Directorial Wrongdoing—The Legal Fiction of Share-
holder Consent in England, in THE CORPORATE DIMENSION 161-77 (Barry A.K. Rider ed., 1998).
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required by much of Part X, and of Part X’s categorical prohibition of specific
transactions, is a set of more indirect mechanisms of accountability that may
operate as a check on the exercise of discretion by disinterested directors.
Finally, U.S. corporation statutes do not themselves criminalize breaches of
duty, as do selected provisions in Part X.  Willful misrepresentations, as well as
market manipulation and insider trading, are criminalized, but by the penalty
provisions in federal and state securities regulation, not by corporate legislation
itself.65  In the absence of fraud, theft, or similar misconduct, the United States
does not criminalize breaches of directors’ duties.
B.  Indemnification and Exculpation
Section 310 in the Companies Act 1985 renders invalid any provision in the
corporate constitution or in a contract that indemnifies corporate officials
against a breach of duty.  In contrast, though subject to a number of qualifica-
tions, conditions, and exceptions, corporation statutes in the United States
permit indemnification of directors and officers who have not succeeded in the
defense of claims against them.  Indemnification is a distinct concept from ex-
culpation, which relieves an actor of liability.  On the indemnity front, section
145 in the Delaware statute specifies the circumstances under which corpora-
tions have power to indemnify in connection with civil or criminal actions or
investigations to which the proposed indemnitee was a party by reason of the
person’s connection to the corporation as its director, officer, employee, or
agent, or by service in like capacity in another enterprise at the corporation’s
request.  To be eligible for indemnification, the proposed indemnitee must have
“acted in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be in or not op-
posed to the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any criminal
action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe such person’s conduct
was unlawful.”66  In actions by or in the right of the corporation, indemnifica-
tion is limited to attorneys’ fees and other expenses,67 while in all other actions
indemnification may also include fines, judgment amounts, and amounts paid in
settlement.68  To the extent the proposed indemnitee’s defense has been suc-
cessful, indemnification is mandatory, as opposed to a discretionary exercise of
the corporation’s power to indemnify.69  The corporation may, however, oblige
itself, by contract, bylaw, or resolution adopted by shareholders or directors, to
exercise its power to indemnify.70
                                                          
65. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1997).
66. DEL. CODE  ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1998).
67. See id. § 145(b).
68. See id. § 145(a).
69. See id. § 145(c).  Some statutes mandate indemnification only when the proposed indemnitee
has been “wholly successful,” see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.52, or only when the successful defense
has been “on the merits,” see CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(d) (West 1999).
70. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (1998).  The corporation may not bind itself to indemnify
beyond the extent of its statutory power to indemnify, which subjects contracts to indemnify to the
statutory standards applicable to the indemnitee’s conduct.  See Waltuch v. Conticommodity Services,
Inc., 88 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying Delaware law).
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The structure of section 145 requires a determination that the proposed in-
demnitee’s conduct met the prescribed standards for eligibility, coupled with a
decision to indemnify if the prescribed standard is met.  Under section 145(d),
the determination, with one exception, may be made by a majority vote of di-
rectors not party to the action, by a committee designated by such directors, by
stockholders, or by independent legal counsel appointed by directors.  If the ac-
tion is by or in the right of the corporation, and the proposed indemnitee has
been adjudged to be liable, indemnification may be made only if the court de-
termines that the person is “fairly and reasonably” entitled to be indemnified.71
Indemnification is similar to exculpation because both reduce the financial
risks and burdens otherwise borne by directors.  Nonetheless, the two doctrines
do not operate identically.  The power to indemnify is the power to expend
corporate assets to benefit a director, whereas the power to exculpate is the
power to release, or preclude the creation of, an underlying liability.  It is help-
ful to examine indemnification and exculpation in connection with the business
judgment rule, itself examined in the Consultation Paper.72  Since the mid-
1980s, corporation statutes in the United States have permitted corporations to
exculpate directors from money damages for liability to the corporation or its
shareholders arising from breaches of the duty of care, through provisions in
the corporation’s articles or certificate of incorporation.73  Exculpation thus ap-
plies more narrowly than does the power to indemnify because it implicates
only breaches of the director’s duty of care owed to the corporation or its
shareholders.  Moreover, a valid exculpatory provision does not create discre-
tionary authority, as does the power to indemnify.  The business judgment rule,
likewise, is a doctrine that reduces risks otherwise borne by directors.  When
the business judgment rule applies, the court does not review the merits of a
decision made by directors.  The rule applies to a director who acted in good
faith and with adequate information, and who was not interested in the transac-
tion or other subject of the judgment.  As formulated by Delaware cases,
moreover, the rule creates a presumption that directors were disinterested and
acted in good faith and with adequate information.74  A litigant challenging the
directors’ decision thus has the burden on whether the business judgment rule
applies.  The business judgment rule is comparable to exculpation because
both, when applicable, preclude a finding of liability.  Unlike indemnification,
but like exculpation, the business judgment rule is not an institution that cre-
ates or confers discretion.  In contrast, the power to indemnify enables a deci-
sionmaker to consider specific circumstances that justify shifting to the corpo-
ration some—or all—of the financial costs incurred by a director, including
settlement or judgment amounts and attorneys’ fees.
                                                          
71. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1998).
72. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 1, ¶¶ 15.30-.41.
73. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1998).  See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Lim-
iting Directors’ Liability, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 295 (1988).
74. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
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Nothing in the U.K. legislation authorizes a comparable discretionary de-
termination by the corporation’s disinterested directors.  The U.K. structure
allocates authority to the court and to the shareholders to relieve directors of
liability, although not to indemnify against expenses.  Section 727 of the Com-
panies Act 1985 permits the court to relieve a director of liability in proceed-
ings against him for negligence, default, breach of duty, or breach of trust if the
court determines that the director has behaved “honestly and reasonably,”
notwithstanding the fact that he is or may be liable, and that the director should
be excused from liability in light of all the circumstances.75  Apart from section
727, to the extent shareholders have discretionary authority, it is to ratify the
director’s conduct, not to indemnify against the financial consequences of the
breach.  Ratification does not reach directors’ breaches of duties owed to third
parties, in contrast to the statutory powers to indemnify created by U.S. corpo-
ration statutes.  Finally, as to some breaches of duty by directors, the U.K. stat-
ute also situates discretionary authority in the prosecutorial offices of the
state.76
To be sure, despite the prohibitory language in section 310, U.K. corporate
legislation expressly permits corporations to purchase director and officer
(“D&O”) insurance.77  The D&O insurer, in the event of a claim by a director
against the policy, evaluates whether the loss is covered by the policy or
whether it is excluded.  Typical language in the U.S. and U.K. policies excludes
coverage when the claim arises from the insured’s intentional misconduct and
when the insured profited personally through the conduct.78  The U.K. legisla-
tion externalizes entirely to a third party—the insurer—the authority to evalu-
ate concrete circumstances.  The evaluation occurs in a contractually defined
context in which the insurer has no discretion to deny coverage for a claim cov-
ered by the policy.  Indemnification statutes, in contrast, create power and dis-
cretion to indemnify defendants whose defense has not succeeded.
V
THE COMMON LAW OF THE DISINTERESTED DIRECTOR
Apart from statutory provisions, the role of the disinterested director is of-
ten at issue in U.S. cases involving self-interested actions taken by directors.
The contrast with U.K. law is especially sharp in two contexts: (1) the individ-
ual pursuit of business opportunities related to the corporation, and
(2) defensive actions in response to hostile takeover bids.  In both contexts,
U.S. law allocates significant decisionmaking discretion to disinterested direc-
tors although judicial oversight has a more expansive and substantive character
when directors take action to defeat or forestall an unwelcome takeover bid.
                                                          
75. See Companies Act 1985, ch. 6, § 727.
76. See, e.g., id. § 317.
77. See id. § 310(2) (as amended by Companies Act 1989, ch. 40, § 137(1)).
78. See CHEFFINS, supra note 19, at 108.
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A.  Corporate Opportunities
The disinterested director’s capacity to exercise discretion when other di-
rectors are conflicted is integral to understanding the major disparity between
doctrine in the United States and its counterpart in the United Kingdom when
a director pursues a business opportunity that is, one way or another, related to
the corporation or to the director’s position.  Divergences among jurisdictions
in the United States turn on the structure, style, and timing of disinterested di-
rectors’ involvement.  Directors in the United Kingdom are held to a strict duty
to account for profits when they personally pursue a business opportunity re-
lated to the company’s line of business.  Only if disinterested directors formally
consider the opportunity and reject it is an individual director free to take the
opportunity personally.  In Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, the House of
Lords required the disgorgement of profit made by directors upon the sale of
shares because the shares were acquired by reason of their positions as direc-
tors, even though the company lacked the financial ability to buy the shares it-
self, the purchasing directors used their own money, and the purchasing direc-
tors’ good faith was not in issue.79  In a later Privy Council decision, Queensland
Mines Ltd. v. Hudson, the director was not liable to account for profits made
because the board previously “knew the facts, decided to renounce the com-
pany’s interest in and assented” to the individual director’s taking the opportu-
nity at his own risk and for his own benefit.80  It is difficult to reconcile Queen-
sland Mines with Regal (Hastings) without legitimating the corporation’s
disinterested directors as a discretionary decisionmaker within the corporation,
a decisionmaker whose assent in good faith obviates the need to turn to the
shareholders.  As Robert Austin notes, though, the Privy Council in Queen-
sland Mines did not explicitly identify a principle that explains why the direc-
tors could reduce the scope of a fellow director’s fiduciary duty without the as-
sent of a majority of shareholders, let alone the assent of all shareholders.81
Some U.S. jurisdictions would not protect the director who pursues such an
opportunity individually unless, as in Queensland Mines, the director first pre-
sented the opportunity to the corporation’s board, following which the board’s
disinterested members, making a collective decision, rejected the opportunity.82
The requirement of formal presentation recognizes that boards generally make
decisions as a group, that group dynamics differ from individualized decision-
making, and that formal presentation at a meeting facilitates both deliberation
and the exchange of opinions among disinterested directors.83  In contrast, the
                                                          
79. 1 Eng. Rep. 378 (1942); [1967] 2 App. Cas. 134.
80. (1978) 52 A.L.R. 379.
81. Robert P. Austin, Fiduciary Accountability for Business Opportunities, in EQUITY AND
COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 141, 183 (Paul D. Finn ed., 1987).
82. This position is concisely stated in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 22, § 5.05(a).
Cases adopting this approach include Klinicki v. Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906 (Or. 1985) and Northeast
Harbor Golf Club v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146 (Me. 1995).
83. See Cellular Information Sys., Inc. v. Broz, 663 A.2d 1180, 1186 (Del. Ch. 1995), rev’d, 673
A.2d 148 (Del. 1996).
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most recent Delaware case of note, Broz v. Cellular Information Systems, Inc.,
explicitly rejected a requirement of formal presentation in favor of a more
loosely formulated requirement of good faith on the part of the director who
takes the opportunity individually.84  In Broz, the opportunity was pursued by
an outside director who, although he did not present it formally to the corpora-
tion’s board, informed the corporation’s CEO and other directors of his inter-
est in the opportunity.  Each told him that they believed the corporation it-
self—only recently emerged from a bankruptcy reorganization—would not be
interested.  To the Delaware Supreme Court, the key point was that the direc-
tor did not take the opportunity surreptitiously.  Commentators on Broz em-
phasize the substantive content of the court’s approach and its focus on the di-
rector’s good faith as opposed to whether the director formally presented the
opportunity to the board.85
As Broz itself illustrates, though, disclosure to board members individually
will not be credible—either to assure that the director acted in good faith or
that the opportunity was handled consistently with the shareholders’ interests—
unless one makes assumptions about the likely behavior of the disinterested di-
rectors.  That is, Broz reflects a court willing to assume that, even in the ab-
sence of a formal presentation and a formal meeting, disinterested directors
will evaluate and react appropriately to information they receive from a fellow
director, asking the necessary questions and bringing matters to the attention of
other directors when circumstances so require.  The institution of the disinter-
ested director is assumed in Broz to be sufficiently robust that a director ap-
proached individually will be no less focused on the corporation’s best interests
than the director would be in considering the matter in the environment of a
formal meeting.  Jurisdictions that require formal presentation repose confi-
dence in disinterested directors acting as a deliberative group, but perhaps
doubt the reliability of one-by-one disclosures and assent.
In other settings, U.S. statutes and cases repose confidence in disinterested
directors under circumstances that invite skepticism  In shareholder derivative
litigation, cases86 and statutes87 authorize the creation of a committee comprised
of directors who did not benefit personally from the transaction impugned by
the suit to evaluate whether maintaining the suit is in the corporation’s best in-
terests.  Jurisdictions vary in the standard of judicial review applicable to a
committee determination that the corporation’s interests would not be best
served by maintaining the suit.88  In contrast to directors asked to assess a self-
                                                          
84. 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996); accord Ostrowski v. Avery, 703 A.2d 117 (Ct. 1997).
85. See John Lowry & Rod Edmunds, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: The Shifting Bounda-
ries of the Duty and its Remedies, 61 MOD. L. REV. 575 (1998).  Another commentator emphasizes that
information concerning the opportunity and the corporation’s financial inability to capture it were
common knowledge.  See Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the
Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 277, 322 (1998).
86. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
87. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.44.
88. See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS § 5:14-:23 (1987 & 1998
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dealing transaction under a safe harbor statute, or directors asked to assess a
colleague’s pursuit of a business opportunity related to the corporation, direc-
tors on a litigation committee are asked to consider whether one of their col-
leagues should be subject to attack by an outsider, the plaintiff in the derivative
suit.  This scenario may presuppose a degree of detachment that few bear to-
ward their colleagues.89  Contrasts with U.K. law have little importance because
of the U.K. law’s imposition of substantive and procedural barriers to share-
holder litigation, points to which I will return below.  It is nonetheless notewor-
thy that although U.K. precedents do not invest discretion in disinterested di-
rectors respecting shareholder derivative litigation, shareholders may be able to
require that an action be discontinued.  In Smith v. Croft, the plaintiffs sought
recovery on behalf of the company of payments made ultra vires to the defen-
dants, who held sixty-two percent of voting power in the company.  The court
held that a majority of the company’s shareholders who were independent of
the defendants could determine that the plaintiffs should not continue to prose-
cute the action.90  Smith v. Croft thus situates discretion in disinterested share-
holders and does not address whether directors might credibly play a role in as-
sessing the merits of derivative actions.
B.  Defenses to Hostile Takeover Bids
Well beyond the scope of Part X and the Consultation Paper, directors’ re-
actions to unwelcome takeover bids for many observers raise the most dramatic
instance of conflict of interest.  Assessing the overall import of U.S. law re-
quires examining its application in this context as well.  A sizable number of
Delaware cases consider the circumstances under which the court should defer
to the judgment of the corporation’s outside directors that the best interests of
the corporation warrant action to defeat a takeover bid.  In Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., the Delaware Supreme Court’s analysis began with the
explicit starting point that, in addressing a takeover bid, a board has a duty to
determine whether it is in the best interests of the corporation and its share-
holders, a determination “no different from any other responsibility it shoul-
                                                          
Supp.).  To date, the litigation committee remains a U.S. phenomenon.  In Canada, a friendlier envi-
ronment for shareholder litigation than the United Kingdom, courts have thus far ascribed no weight
to recommendations made by litigation committees.  See Brian R. Cheffins, Reforming the Derivative
Action: The Canadian Experience and British Prospects, 2 COMPANY FIN. & INSOLVENCY L. REV. 227,
253 (1997).
89. See James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations
and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 99-108 (Summer
1985).
90. See Smith v. Croft, 3 W.L.R. 405, 442, 453-56 (Ch. 1987).  The court’s willingness to permit a
“majority within the minority” to defeat the plaintiff’s right to pursue a derivative action may well
manifest “hostility and disdain” toward the utility of derivative litigation.  See A. J. Boyle, The Judicial
Review of the Special Litigation Committee: The Implications for the English Derivative Action After
Smith v. Croft, 11 CO. LAW. 3, 5 (1990).  Unlike the U.S. precedents, the case does not authorize direc-
tors to make discretionary determinations concerning derivative suits.  See ELIZABETH BOROS,
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS’ REMEDIES 199 (1995) (noting that Smith v. Croft requires dismissal
based on determination by a majority of independent shareholders).
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ders, and its decisions should be no less entitled to the respect they otherwise
would be accorded in the realm of business judgment.”91  Given the risk that di-
rectors might err and act primarily in their own interest when control of the
company is at issue, directors bear the burden of showing that they acted in
good faith and reasonably investigated what they perceived to be a threat to
“corporate policy and effectiveness.”92  Additionally, Unocal requires that the
directors’ action be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.  Demonstrating
that the defensive actions were taken in good faith is “materially enhanced . . .
by the approval of a board comprised of a majority of outside independent di-
rectors who have acted in accordance with the foregoing standards,” that is,
good faith and reasonable independence.93
The court’s starting point in Unocal, as well as the prominent roles it assigns
to outside directors and the reviewing court, contrast sharply with the law and
with takeover regulation in the United Kingdom.  The leading case, Hogg v.
Cramphorn,94 requires that shareholders ratify an allotment of new shares made
by directors to defeat a threatened takeover.  To the same general effect, and in
great detail, the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers requires the approval of
shareholders at a general meeting for actions by the board that frustrate an out-
standing or an imminent bid.95  Thus, actions that Unocal characterizes as
within the discretion of the board to undertake in discharging its responsibili-
ties require, instead, submission to the shareholders for a vote.  Nor is the re-
quirement different when the board is principally comprised of outside direc-
tors.  Additionally, although it has received statutory backing, the City Code is
enforced by a self-regulatory body, and the leading precedents expressly dis-
courage resort to the courts.96
Central to the analysis in Unocal is the court’s initial characterization: Re-
sponding to a takeover bid is no different from any other responsibility within
the board’s unilateral responsibility.  Implicitly, the opinion acknowledges the
possibility that the interests of the corporation may be different from those of
its shareholders because, in evaluating the threat posed to the corporation, di-
rectors may take into account the interests of nonshareholder constituents, in-
cluding employees and creditors.97  In the United Kingdom, in contrast, such a
                                                          
91. 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
92. Id. at 955.
93. Id.
94. 1967 Ch. 254.
95. City Code, General Principle 7 & Rule 21.
96. See The Queen v. Takeover Panel, ex parte Datafin plc, 1987 Q.B. 815 (C.A.); The Queen v.
Takeover Panel, ex parte Guinness plc, 1990 1 Q.B. 146 (C.A.).
97. See 493 A.2d at 955.  Moreover, if the structure of the bid itself threatens shareholders’ inter-
ests, remedies are likely to be available to them.  In Unocal itself, the bidder proposed to buy sufficient
shares for cash to give it control, and then to merge with the target in exchange for highly subordinated
debt securities.  Shareholders in the target who were cashed out through the merger transaction would
have available a statutory appraisal remedy.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1998).  Delaware law
would also characterize the cash-out merger as self-dealing by the new controlling shareholder—the
erstwhile bidder—and require the controlling shareholder to establish the “entire fairness” of the
merger transaction, including the fairness of the price received by the minority.  See Weinberger v.
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determination is outside of the directors’ unilateral control.  Unocal explicitly
declines to find that all directors of a takeover target are so conflicted in their
exercise of judgment that they should be required to be passive.98  As noted,
though, Unocal distinguishes between outside directors—who stand to lose
control of the corporation and the benefits of their office—and inside direc-
tors—who additionally stand to lose their employment and likely their principal
source of income.  The distinction, though, does not operate as clearly and dis-
positively between financially interested and disinterested directors as does the
distinction drawn by safe harbor statutes discussed above.  If the corporation
has a majority of outside directors, Unocal treats their presence only as en-
hancing the directors’ ability to show that they acted in good faith.  Unocal does
not foreclose substantive judicial review of the fit between the defensive ac-
tions and the perceived threat.
The court’s ultimate resolution, moreover, departs from the consequences
of its initial characterization in two respects.  First, most shareholder claims
that directors have abused the powers of their positions, and, in particular, that
they have used corporate assets in a self-serving manner, allege injury suffered
in the first instance by the corporation itself.99  Unless the shareholder alleges a
separate individual injury distinct from that suffered by the corporation, the
claim must be litigated through a shareholder derivative suit, a procedurally
and substantively more complex vehicle than an individual action or a class, or
representative, action that aggregates individual claims.  Cases establishing
Delaware’s ground rules for responses to hostile takeovers pass over or deal
summarily with the question of characterization, finding individual claims with
frequency.100  What in other contexts could be significant formal questions are
submerged in the court’s articulation of substantive analysis to establish ground
rules important to the conduct and orderly resolution of high-stakes corporate
combat.
Second, unlike disputes arising from other exercises of the board’s business
judgment, the decisionmaking discretion of directors who respond to a take-
over bid is subject to additional limits.  As noted above, Unocal itself requires a
reasonable relationship between the action taken by the board and the per-
ceived threat.  Later Delaware cases, beginning with Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,101 restrict the range of the board’s permissible
exercise of discretion when it is inevitable that the company will be sold or
                                                          
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
98. See 493 A.2d at 955.
99. For an earlier example of a derivative suit in the context of a threatened takeover, see Cheff v.
Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
100. For a recent example, see Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998).  Like-
wise, if the shareholder alleges conduct problematic on its face in connection with a negotiated or
friendly transaction, the court is not insistent on imposing the complications of derivative litigation.
See, e.g., Parnes v. Bally Entertainment Corp., 722 A.2d 1243 (Del. 1999) (allegation that corporation’s
CEO received improper cash payment to induce acceptance of merger proposal sufficient to establish
claims of individual injury).
101. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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when the company itself initiates a sale.  The board’s duty at that point is to act
in good faith to obtain the best deal available for the shareholders.  Addition-
ally, takeover responses that purposefully disenfranchise shareholders require a
compelling justification.102  Even though that standard appears rarely, if ever, to
be met, it does not require that a defensive mechanism with disenfranchising
effects be submitted to shareholders for a vote.  Instead, the court assesses the
strength of the justification proffered by directors.  Thus, the Delaware cases
depart from the full consequences of characterizing directors’ responses to
takeover bids as no different from any other decision the board might make.
Even with the restrictions on directors’ discretion imposed by the cases, though,
directors retain unilateral authority, subject to judicial review but not to share-
holder vote to approve or disapprove the directors’ actions.103
VI
A POTEMKIN VILLAGE?
It is open to debate whether investing discretion in disinterested directors is
effective as a mechanism to protect the interests of shareholders.  Inevitably,
one next asks: “Compared with what?”104  Professor Victor Brudney, for exam-
ple, characterized the net result of the arrangements described above as a
“Potemkin village,” in which reality belies appearances.105  Interestingly,
though, Professor Brudney’s preferred solutions are to prohibit selected types
of transactions likely to be abusive106 and to empower administrative agencies
to review other transactions,107 but not to mandate or enlarge the role for trans-
action-specific approval by shareholders.  An alternative that has recently at-
tracted attention is the shareholder-initiated adoption of bylaws that negate,
mandate, or regulate specific actions otherwise within directors’ managerial
authority.  Case law to date is sparse, apart from a recent opinion from the
Oklahoma Supreme Court upholding a bylaw requiring that poison pill plans
                                                          
102. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. 1988).  By statute, Georgia grants
directors greater discretion in structuring takeover defenses that disenfranchise shareholders.  See In-
vacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
103. It is not coincidental that Unocal coincided chronologically with what appears to be an en-
hancement of the content of directors’ duty of care.  In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme
Court declined to defer to directors who acquiesced in the terms of a merger negotiated by their CEO
because the directors lacked information relevant to the company’s value, apart from the fact that the
merger represented a substantial premium over the price at which the stock traded.  See 488 A.2d 858
(Del. 1985).  Enhancing the demands placed on directors does not suggest any general lack of confi-
dence in the wisdom of reposing confidence in directors’ capacity to exercise discretion.
104. Shareholder approval requirements may erect a Potemkin village of their own if most share-
holders are apathetic and large institutional shareholders defer to directors for reasons unrelated to
the interests of all shareholders.  See Sheldon Leader & Janet Dine, United Kingdom, in THE LEGAL
BASIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 219, 238 (Arthur R. Pinto & Gustavo Visentini eds., 1998).
105. See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95
HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982).
106. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1431 n. 73 (1985).
107. See Brudney, supra note 105, at 627 n.77.
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be submitted to shareholders for a vote.108  In particular, Delaware courts have
not addressed the validity of such bylaws under the Delaware statute, which
enables shareholders to act unilaterally in adopting, amending, or repealing
bylaws but also confers comparable unqualified power on directors.109
Empirical studies to date are not conclusive on whether independent direc-
tors make a measurable contribution to shareholder value.110  The likelihood
that a board will terminate a poorly performing top executive increases with
the proportion of independent directors.111  Two recent studies, one by Ira Mil-
stein and Paul MacAvoy and one by Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black, reach
disparate conclusions.  Bhagat and Black’s data find no connection between
outside director dominance and shareholder value.  In contrast, Millstein and
MacAvoy find a significant relationship between an active independent board
and corporate performance.112  Much appears to depend on the metrics chosen
to evaluate the directors’ performance and the time interval studied.  More-
over, how great an impact corporate law has on corporate behavior and on
shareholder value is itself difficult to specify, at least in isolation from product
and labor markets and social norms.113
A final point of contrast between the United States and the United King-
dom illustrates the complex relationships between corporate governance pat-
terns and the style of institutional responses to recurrent problems.  Takeover
regulation in the United Kingdom has long included a mandatory bid require-
ment, applicable once a person acquires thirty percent or more of the voting
                                                          
108. See International Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., 975 P.2d 907 (Ok. 1999).
109. See Lawrence A. Hammermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws:
Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409 (1998).  In a different context, the Delaware Supreme
Court held recently that any limitation on the board of directors’ authority to manage the corpora-
tion’s business or affairs must be contained in the certificate of incorporation.  See Quickturn Design
Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998).  In Quickturn, the court invalidated a poison pill
adopted by the directors that contained a “delayed redemption” provision, which provided that no
newly elected board could redeem the plan for six months after taking office in order to facilitate a
transaction with a party that supported election of the new board.  The Court noted the provision was
additionally invalid because it might require directors to breach their fiduciary duties.  See id. at 1292.
Much the same arguments could be made respecting the impact of shareholder-initiated bylaws that
purport to prohibit or direct actions by directors.
110. For a citation to this extensive literature, see Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and Ac-
countability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 12 n.10 (Summer 1999).  To function successfully, outside directors must
be able to retain and exercise independent judgment in dealing with the senior executives—who may
also be directors—who operate the firm on a day-to-day basis.  Outside directors also must be able to
obtain, at relatively low cost, information about the operational decisions that would be optimal for the
firm in order to assess the performance of executive management.  See Ernst Maug, Boards of Direc-
tors and Capital Structure: Alternative Forms of Corporate Restructuring, 3 J. CORP. FIN. 113, 134
(1997).
111. See James D. Cox, The ALI, Institutionalization, and Disclosure: The Quest for the Outside Di-
rector’s Spine, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1233, 1241 (1993).
112. See Ira Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of the
Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1321 n.46 (1998).
113. See Edward B. Rock, America’s Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate Governance,
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 387 (1996).
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power in a company.114  The acquiring person must offer to buy the other shares
on terms no less than the highest price that the offeror paid in the preceding
twelve months.115  The mandatory bid requirement, which has no counterpart in
the United States, operates to reduce the number of situations that severely
test the loyalty of directors when a shareholder acquires control of a corpora-
tion.  In contrast, the United States is friendlier to litigation brought by minor-
ity shareholders,116 facilitating judicial review of transactions that arguably
benefit the controlling shareholder at the expense of all other shareholders, re-
gardless of whether the directors themselves may have been disinterested.117  In
an environment that is less litigation-friendly, the mandatory bid offers a dif-
ferent style of response to the risk that a controlling shareholder will exploit its
position at the expense of the minority.118
VII
CONCLUSION: A DUAL PORTRAIT?
I began with a visual metaphor that characterized U.S. corporate law as a
painting dominated by a portrait of an individual—the disinterested director—
contrasted with the U.K. landscape, which lacks a comparable figure.  More ac-
curately observed, U.S. corporate law is a dual portrait in which the court fig-
ures prominently, if somewhat less immediately in view than the disinterested
director.  Many contrasts, most beyond the scope of this paper, can be drawn
with the United Kingdom to explain courts’ prominence in the United States.
The United States does not suffer from any shortage of litigation and, given an
observed willingness to resort to civil litigation to resolve all manner of dis-
putes, it is not surprising that the court is a prominent actor or figure in connec-
tion with disputes focused on corporate governance. Of great practical signifi-
cance is the absence in the United States of a general rule shifting to
unsuccessful litigants the costs of their successful adversaries.119
In both countries, shareholders lurk in the background of each painting, but
in very different ways.  Corporate law in the United Kingdom relies heavily on
                                                          
114. See City Code, Rule 9.1.
115. See id. Rule 9.5.
116. The relative unfriendliness of U.K. courts is illustrated by the recent litigation,  In re Astec
(BSR) Plc., 2 B.C.L.C. 556 (1998), summarized in Stephen Copp & Robert Goddard, Corporate Gov-
ernance Principles on Trial, 19 COMPANY LAW. 277 (1998).  Astec has a 51% shareholder that was not
subject to the mandatory bid requirement because it is resident in Hong Kong and thus not subject to
the City Code.  The court dismissed a shareholder claim brought under section 459 of the Companies
Act 1985, alleging that Astec’s controlling shareholder caused it to be run in a manner that breached
the shareholder’s legitimate expectations concerning corporate governance.
117. See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., discussed supra Part IV.A.
118. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer argue that, for most countries, corporate law reform
“should focus, not on the risk of empire-building by managers, but rather on the incentives and capa-
bilities of controlling shareholders with large equity stakes to pursue strategies that benefit them at the
expense of the minority shareholders.” LAPORTA ET AL., supra note 4, at 5.  In countries that lack
good protection for shareholders, wide dispersion in shareholding is scarce, especially among medium-
sized companies.  See id. at 22-23.
119. See CHEFFINS, supra note 19, at 342.
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transaction-specific approval by shareholders to validate direct self-dealing and
other types of conflict transactions, but does not require that the election of di-
rectors be structured to achieve broadly based shareholder participation.  In
the United States, in contrast, shareholders are significant as litigants who in-
voke the court’s scrutiny, while shareholder voting to approve or disapprove
transactions is not a mandatory legitimating device.120  Mandatory rules in the
United States require that directors be elected in a manner that formally le-
gitimates their representative relationship with shareholders.  While the rela-
tive degree of dispersion in share-ownership in each country is a possible ex-
planation for these contrasts, more than one relationship is possible between
relative dispersion in share-ownership and the regulation and occurrence of
self-dealing transactions.
Moreover, for some of the contrasts drawn in this article, differences in the
preferred style of legal reasoning and in the perceived function of courts may
be relevant.  A reader of the Delaware takeover cases, trained in law in the
United Kingdom, might well be surprised by the ease with which the court
surmounts preliminary questions going to the plaintiff’s standing and the ripe-
ness of the dispute for adjudication, as well as whether the claim asserted in the
case is properly characterized as an individual or a corporate claim that may be
litigated only in a derivative action.  And the reader’s U.S. counterpart would
be surprised by the degree to which the legacy of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle121
forecloses adjudication when directors are not alleged to have committed a
nonratifiable wrong, and by the dominance of preliminary standing questions in
cases like Prudential Assurance Co. v. Newman Industries, Ltd.122
                                                          
120. Shareholder approval is, of course, mandated by statute for specific fundamental transactions,
such as mergers and sales of all or substantially all assets.  See generally Luca Enriques, The Law on
Company Directors’ Self-dealing: A Comparative Analysis, INT’L & COMP. CORP. L.J. (forthcoming
2000) (surveying corporate law in the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, France, and Germany).
Professor Geoffrey Miller characterizes the difference between the United States and the United
Kingdom as reflecting “alternative approaches to controlling agency costs”; in the United Kingdom,
the “threat or reality of a hostile takeover bid” means a firm’s managers are in jeopardy of replace-
ment if they do not maximize asset values, while in the United States, the shareholder’s derivative ac-
tion is more prominent.  Geoffrey Miller, Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Some Points
of Contrast Between the United States and England, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 52, 52 (1998).  Profes-
sor Miller’s explanation emphasizes differences in political structure in the two countries—the unitary
system of U.K. government is more accommodating to takeovers because anti-takeover forces are sig-
nificant at dispersed state-based legislation and judicial levels in the United States, and the political
influence of the organized bar explains the more hospitable environment for derivative litigation in the
United States.  Professor Miller’s account does not, however, examine how each country treats the
more generic forms of self-dealing differently, or the different roles ascribed to disinterested directors
and to shareholder voting.
It is also important to recognize that the structure of U.K. corporate law affects the reported ag-
gregate number of takeover bids.  The absence of statutory provisions enabling negotiated merger
transactions likely means that more transactions that are entirely friendly ones commence as takeover
bids in the United Kingdom than is the case for counterpart transactions in the United States.  This
fact is not, of course, inconsistent with Professor Miller’s argument, but it does suggest that the re-
ported level of takeover bids in the U.K. is not as threatening to incumbent management as it might
initially appear to be.
121. (1843) 2 Hare 461.
122. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 31 (C.A.); see also SEALY, supra note 58, at 54.
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Overall, this material may illustrate the degree to which the U.K. “vision of
law tends to the formal side, while the [United States] tends to the substan-
tive,” a contrast carefully developed by Professors Patrick Atiyah and Robert
Summers.123  Even the business judgment rule—which, when applicable, pro-
tects directors from liability—enables the court to make substantive threshold
assessments of whether the defendant directors were disinterested and whether
they acted in good faith and with adequate information,  questions likely to cast
some light on the presumptive merits of the transaction itself.124  Over the long
haul, these kinds of differences, which go to the larger legal culture in which
corporate law operates, may be more significant than differences on more spe-
cific doctrinal points because they define the range and potential of available
institutions, as well as the ability of multiple institutions to complement and
correct each other.125
To be sure, U.S. corporate law is in many respects as fully formal in concept
and operation as its U.K. counterpart.  The point of corporate law, in part, is to
permit the creation of a legal person distinct from its organizers and its sepa-
rate owners.  Were this not the starting point, one firmly entrenched in theory
as well as practice, transactions that require drawing distinctions between the
corporation’s property and that of its owners would be more cumbersome to
effect.126  Indeed, the intersection of agency law with contract law would make
many such transactions impossible, due to the bedrock principle of agency that
a principal always has power to revoke an agent’s authority, despite contracting
not to do so, unless the authority is granted as security for an independent pro-
                                                          
123. PATRICK S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,  FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
415 (1987).
124. If these questions arise in a derivative suit in a Delaware corporation, the context is likely to
be whether the plaintiff must make a demand on the corporation’s directors prior to filing suit, or
whether the plaintiff’s failure to make a demand is excusable because making the demand would have
been futile.  Despite its complexities, the gist of the Delaware doctrine is whether a majority of the
corporation’s directors, as to the transaction challenged by the derivative suit, made a decision that
would be protected by the business judgment doctrine.
125. Relatedly, Professor Gower noted that
English courts tend to be strict when they have a rule of thumb to apply, such as the rule that
directors must not take personal advantage of a corporate opportunity.  They move with less
assurance when they have no fixed standard to guide them.  American courts are perhaps
rather more ready, or perhaps one should say less unready, to hold that directors’ action ex-
ceeds the permissible bounds of their business judgment.
Gower, supra note 3, at 1383.
126. Moreover, it is not possible to justify the corporate veil principle that insulates shareholders
from corporate obligations unless the corporation’s formally separate existence is taken seriously.  But
see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL B. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 41 (1991) (stating that “[i]f limited liability were not the starting point in corporate law, firms
would create it by contract”).  A nonparty would, of course, not be bound by an attempt to create lim-
ited liability through agreement.  Some contractualist accounts of corporate law, in an attempt to
maintain contact with descriptive accuracy, define contract very expansively, to encompass non-
excludable mandatory rules of law and other elements in the parties’ association that do not result
from any real bargaining.  See Ross Grantham, The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Share-
holders, 57 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 554, 580 (1998).
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prietary interest of the agent’s.127  In a contractually constituted association,
that is, one in which directors were no more than shareholders’ agents, their
power to bind shareholders to third parties—often to the advantage of all
shareholders—would be unstable.  That corporate law reflects a necessary for-
malism does not, of course, specify the degree or extent to which interests
should be ascribed to the corporation that are distinct from its owners’ inter-
ests.128  Nor does the corporation’s distinct identity, separate from its share-
holders, entail that directors may exercise discretion to further interests at odds
with those of shareholders.129
Only the most self-confident of aesthetes would categorically endorse a
preference for portraits over landscapes.  Many factors, I have suggested, help
explain the contrasts between the landscape presented by U.K. corporate law
and its counterpart portrait in the United States.  The criterion by which each
should be assessed is its contribution to adaptive efficiency, that is to the “trials,
experiments, and innovations” requisite to creative activity and the resolution
of problems over time.130  Comparisons between legal systems may be helpful in
this regard because they illustrate the possibility of alternate doctrines and in-
stitutions as well as their limitations.  Comparisons of systems that are similar
in many respects, but divergent in others, also suggest that convergence over
time is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon.  In particular, similar capital market
                                                          
127. See Francis Reynolds, When Is an Agent’s Authority Irrevocable?, in MAKING COMMERCIAL
LAW 259 (Ross Cranston ed., 1997).  Moreover, the doctrines examined in this article illustrate the d e-
gree to which corporate law in the United Kingdom and the United States has in significant respects
pulled away from the general law into its distinct and separate realm.  In general law, for example, a
fiduciary’s contract with a beneficiary as to matters within the scope of their relationship is voidable by
the beneficiary unless it is on fair terms and unless all beneficiaries manifest assent with full under-
standing of their legal rights and all relevant facts that the fiduciary knows or should know. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 173 (1981).  This principle is at odds with the role as-
signed to disinterested directors in U.S. corporate law, as well as with the majoritarian norm applicable
to shareholder voting in U.K. corporate law.
128. As with any formal construct, dispute is always possible over how far one should take its con-
sequences.  It is not helpful simply to characterize the construct as a fiction.  Consider in this light J.L.
Austin’s insights into a related practice—pretending.  When we pretend, as when we deem a corpora-
tion to be a legally separate person, we are treating one thing as something else.  Professor Austin
wrote:
[T]here are in fact, as we should expect, ways in which limits and the overstepping of limits
are relevant to the concept of pretending, as to so many others.  On a festive occasion you are
ordered, for a forfeit, to pretend to be a hyena: going down on all fours, you make a few at-
tempts at hideous laughter and finally bite my calf, taking, with a touch of realism possibly
exceeding your hopes, a fair-sized piece right out of it.  Beyond question you have gone too
far.
J.L. Austin, Pretending, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 201, 204 (J.O. Urmson & G.J. Warnock eds., 1970)
(footnote omitted).  The footnote to this passage states: “In these circumstances.  But if Nero ordered
you, in the arena, to pretend to be a hyena, it might be unwisely perfunctory not to take a piece right
out.”  Id. n.1 (emphasis in original).
129. It is thus not necessary to argue that the corporation is not a “distinct and identifiable entity”
as a step in an argument that directors’ decisions should be made to further the interests of sharehold-
ers.  See Bradley et al., supra note 110, at 35.
130. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 80-81
(1990).  See also Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institu-
tions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 342-45 (1996).
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mechanisms may co-exist with divergent internal approaches to governance.
Changes in corporate governance patterns are not likely to erase distinctive lo-
cal traits, given the dependence of corporate governance on broader social
practices and the larger legal culture.
